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ABSTRACT
Policy interventions, to increase participation, have long been informed 
by data demonstrating inequity in the subsidised cultural sector. However, 
it is less clear how evidence is employed to judge success or failure of 
initiatives to create greater equity. Indeed, quantitative surveys suggest 
a failure to change patterns of cultural participation. Despite this a large 
body of evaluation reports celebrate the ‘success’ of participatory projects. 
This article presents findings from UK research that explores how cultural 
participation policies might be improved by better acknowledgment of 
failures. The research involved interviews, questionnaires, workshops, 
observations and documentary analysis involving over 200 policymakers, 
cultural practitioners, and participants. It identified a cultural policy land-
scape that is not conducive to honesty or critical reflection and argues 
that without this it will persistently fail to learn or to deliver the scale of 
change required to create the equity it professes to desire.
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Introduction
A culture of evaluation, to supposedly inform ‘evidence-based policy’, has been a significant feature 
of the relationship between cultural policy and practice, in the UK at least, since the 1980’s when 
Myerscough developed his economic case for culture (1988). In the case of cultural participation, 
which is the focus of this research, much of the policy focus on increasing participation is cited as 
a response to the data generated in surveys such as Taking Part (DCMS 2018) or the Scottish 
Household Survey (SHS) (Scottish Government 2018), which show differing and unequal patterns 
of engagement across a specific list of cultural activities. Both of these examples demonstrate how 
data and the evidence that data supports can be used to shape and influence high-level policy 
aspirations and goals. However, advocates of evidence-based policy argue, ‘if policy is goal-driven, 
evaluation should be goal-oriented. Such evaluation completes the cycle and provides feedback to 
improve the policy’ (Sanderson 2002). In other words, if policy is truly ‘evidence-based’ there should 
be as much concern with gathering data and evidence of the extent to which policy interventions 
are, or are not, delivering policy goals as there was in establishing the original need.
In the case of cultural participation, data and evidence has informed the way in which the ‘problem’ of 
non-participation has been constructed (Stevenson 2013) as a ‘participation deficit’ (Miles and Gibson 
2017). This in turn has influenced the types of policy interventions that are seen as ‘appropriate’ to ‘fix’ the 
problem (Jancovich 2011). However, it is far less clear how data and evidence have been employed to 
judge the success or failure of such policy interventions in achieving the goal of ‘increasing’ cultural 
participation. Indeed, although repeated iterations of Taking Part and the SHS show a failure to 
substantially or sustainably change patterns of cultural participation (Warwick Commission 2015) there 
is a tendency for the discourse around such projects to be one of success (Rimmer 2020) with evaluation 
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reports and impact case studies primarily focused on celebrating successes rather than learning from 
failure (for example: Fun Palaces 2019). Yet these successes are often evidenced with reference to 
a diverse range of criteria that have little to do with the goal of sustainably increasing diversity and 
equity within the cultural sector, which many of these projects were ostensibly funded to deliver. Indeed, 
as we will argue below, through stories of unqualified success the participation agenda has taken 
a performative turn, in which evaluation practices generate and sustain a narrative that does more to 
legitimise rather than challenge existing inequities.
This article presents some of the findings from UK research that has considered how cultural 
participation policies, projects, and practices might be improved by better acknowledgment and 
discussion of failures. In this wider research, we examine how different stakeholders (including 
artists, participants, and funders) may define success and failure in different ways, based on different 
logics and values, but for the purpose of this paper the focuses is on policy.
We therefore begin with an examination of how the notion of ‘evidence-based policy’ has been 
critiqued in the wider public policy literature. We highlight the growing interest in moving beyond 
current practices in which evaluation is primarily understood as a tool for monitoring against targets 
or performance management. We then move on to consider the literature on policy failures and 
specifically the extent to which policies ever result in outright success or failure. From this, we argue 
that if evaluation is to be credible and engender the type of learning that leads to meaningful policy 
change it must fully recognise and reflect on both.
The findings from our research draw on a large body of empirical data, collected via interviews, 
workshops, and surveys with policymakers, cultural practitioners and participants. In our discussion, 
we consider the barriers to talking openly about failures; and examine how capturing and sharing 
narratives of failure might usefully inform the development of cultural policy. Our aim throughout 
this research has been to develop new insights into the processes of cultural policy making and we 
conclude with a call for more honest and open critical reflection in the cultural sector, recognising 
that narratives underpin policy decisions as much as data and evidence.
Evidence-based policy
Beyond the field of cultural policy studies, the notion of evidence-based policy has long dominated 
the wider field of policy studies (Colebatch 1998). It is founded on the principle of decision-making 
that ‘seek[s] to manage economic and social affairs “rationally” in an apolitical, scientized manner 
such that social policy is more or less an exercise in social technology’ (Schwandt 1997). In other 
words, it assumes policies will deliver better results if those instigating and implementing them 
make rational decisions on ‘what works’ based on a technocratic understanding of ‘best practice’ 
rather than through understanding the political values, meanings, and ideologies that underpin 
decision-making (Clarke, Pawson, and Tilley 1998; Pawson 2012). Yet the evidence base for making 
claims about the benefits of evidence-based policy has itself come under question. In particular, the 
concept of rational choice has been challenged for its assumption that data and evidence are neutral 
objects, not open to interpretation (Sanderson 2002). Furthermore, as Howlett contends, ‘an 
emphasis only upon technical learning may not lessen, but in fact contribute to a continued lack 
of policy success; that is, repeating over and over again the errors of the past’ (Howlett 2012a).
In contrast, the constructivist (Guba and Lincoln 1989) interpretative (Yanow 2000) and argu-
mentative (Fischer and Forester 1993) theoretical traditions all argue for an understanding of the 
politics of policymaking, and the complexity of the social world in which any knowledge (or 
evidence) is both constructed and contingent. The rational approach, conducted through the 
application of objective rules by disinterested observers is therefore rejected (Stone 2012) and 
instead policymaking, and the analysis that is conducted to inform it, should be seen as political 
choices (Weiss 1977). From this standpoint, while surveys such as Taking Part and the SHS may 
inform the construction of a policy problem more attention must be paid to the values and logics 
that inform policymakers choices in how they address such problems and in doing so categorise 
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certain people and behaviours as being more socially valuable than others (Stevenson 2019). As 
such, the act of evaluation should also be understood as political because it contributes to the 
construction of normative positions via the questions that are asked and the measures that are 
employed.
But as Cairney suggests neither the evidence-based nor the political choice perspectives are of 
themselves an accurate description of what actually happens in the policy process, which he 
describes as a complex process functioning under conditions of ‘bounded rationality’ (Cairney 
2012, 2016). In reality, the policy process ‘weighs beliefs, principles and actions under conditions 
of multiple frames for the interpretation and evaluation of the world’ (Van Der Knaap 1995). From 
this perspective, evaluation research plays a conceptual rather than instrumental role, ‘reaching 
decision makers in unsystematic and diffuse forms, “percolating” into the policy arena’ (Sanderson 
2002) through a process of ‘disproportionate information processing’ (Cairney 2012) rather than 
rational thought or ideology alone.
Despite these critiques, assumptions about both the prevalence and desirability of evidence- 
based policymaking has remained widespread (Colebatch 1998; Cairney 2016). In the UK identifying 
‘robust’ evidence is still seen as the cornerstone for policymaking in two distinct ways (Sanderson 
2002). The first is accountability that government and its agents are delivering the outcomes they 
have committed to. Here evidence relates to performance management and is most commonly 
associated with monitoring and measurement of ‘impact’. In the cultural sector, this is what has 
commonly been criticised as the tendency for research to ‘make the case’ for culture. The second use 
of evidence is to inform ‘improvement’ based on evidence of how policy interventions achieve 
change. The growth in What Works Centres provides an example of this in the UK (Gold 2018). But as 
Sayers (2020) argues the degree of certainty, of cause and effect, that can be delivered through 
evidence-based approaches to policymaking such as ‘what works’ is overstated. Rather than eviden-
cing ‘truths’, at best they might help to avoid error.
Instead of more ‘evidence’ others argue that what is needed, but less common in practice, is 
policy analysis that seeks to pragmatically understand the ‘implementation gap’ in order to explain 
not only what works but also for whom and in which circumstances. Such an approach is also as 
interested in what doesn’t work as what does, so as to ensure that similar failures might be avoided 
in future (Hogwood and Gunn 1984) and the benefits of future interventions can be dispersed more 
equitably. This is not an argument against the use of evidence, but rather that greater attention 
needs to be given to the extent that different groups of stakeholders with different lived experiences 
and drawing on distinct value systems may interpret and experience policy success and failure in 
very different ways.
For rather than truly objective evidence, it is the construction and replication of a dominant 
policy narrative that has greatest influence over policy decisions. As such, those who can exert the 
greatest social power seek to retain control over the articulation of the dominant narrative (Taylor 
and Balloch 2005). A key element of this control is the ability to frame certain activity as a success, 
in spite of any evidence to the contrary. Such failures to learn and/or respond to such learning are 
further policy failures. It is therefore argued that the guiding principle for critical policy analysis 
should be to address the fundamental questions of: Who learns? Learns what? To what effect? 
(Howlett 2012a).
Policy failure
Dye (2005) suggests that, in general, governments have little clarity as to whether or not their 
policies have been successful. However, this does not stop them from framing such interventions as 
successes (Fischer 2003). Despite an emerging interest in theorising failure within policy studies, 
there also remains a scarcity of literature that explicitly considers policy failure in practice and even 
less that specifically considers failure in regard to cultural policy. It has been argued that this is the 
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result of ‘blame avoidance’ in policy making, which is perhaps the largest barrier to learning and 
change given that,
. . . this can amplify policy failures rather than correct them as energy and resources are spent on avoiding blame, 
denying the existence of failure . . . rather than on improving policy (Howlett, Ramesh, and Wu 2015)
Interestingly, it is argued that this is most in evidence within the bodies that appear to be the most 
accountable. Paradoxically many evaluations that try to demonstrate accountability may in fact 
reinforce overstated celebratory narratives while failing to examine the ‘root causes’ of problems or 
the persistent failures that are limiting more significant progress being made (Howlett, Ramesh, and 
Wu 2015). This, McConnell (2010) argues, can lead to good politics but bad policy.
However, this is not to say that the term ‘failure’ is not used in policy analysis at all, rather that it is 
used inconsistently, without clear definition. This means that,
. . . arguments relating to policy failure are not only ambiguous, but they also tend to conflate forms of failure 
that are actually discrete. This imprecision has led to confusion in theoretical debates as well as uncertainty in 
policy evaluation, as opposing voices tend to talk past each other rather than contest well-defined positions 
(Newman and Head 2015)
In response to these difficulties, public policy academics have proposed taxonomies and frameworks 
to assist in the analysis of policy failure. For example, Bovens et al have argued that any evaluation of 
policies needs to differentiate between programme success/failure and political success/failure 
(Bovens and ‘T Hart 1996;). While the former is more concerned with effectiveness the latter is 
more concerned with perception. To this initial classification, McConnell (2010) added a third 
category, process failures, in order to categorise specific failures related to policy implementation.
Building on this work a review of the existing literature identified that when authors do comment 
on policy failure(s) they are usually referring to one of four ‘modes’ of failure:
● Objective attainment failure: when policy objectives are not met
● Distributional failure: when some stakeholders groups are negatively affected by the policy
● Political or electoral failure: when politicians are negatively affected
● Implementation failure: when organisational or other obstacles prevent implementation 
(Newman and Head 2015)
But confusion and conflation between each of these often obscures understanding not least because 
different modes of failure have different causes. It is argued therefore that any conclusions, recom-
mendations or remedies should be considered in regard to each mode independently. Our own 
research is informed by these taxonomies but seeks to test their efficacy within the field of cultural 
policy and in so doing develop a bespoke taxonomy that recognises the different logics, values and 
meanings that underpin policy making in the cultural sector.
Notwithstanding the existence of what Gray and Hart have dubbed ‘policy disasters’ (2005), it is 
further noted that policy outcomes are rarely, if ever, outright successes or failures but contain 
elements of each (McConnell 2010). For example, if the aims, values, and logics of policymakers and 
practitioners are different their measures of success and failure may also differ. Similarly, policies that 
don’t meet the initially stated objectives can, nevertheless, be political successes and vice versa. This 
is particularly the case in regard to those wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) in which 
governments tend to seek to address symptoms rather than causes (Stringer and Richardson 
1980) or to adopt ‘placebo’ policies that are primarily enacted in order to manage a difficult issue 
down or off of the political agenda (Gustafsson 1983). In such cases policies take on a significant 
symbolic function, demonstrating a government’s commitment to addressing the perceived pro-
blem rather than ‘solving’ it. This has been demonstrated to be the case with cultural participation, 
where policy interventions are celebrated for widening ‘access’ to culture despite failing to evidence 
significant and long-term change in the baseline data around which the ‘problem’ of cultural non- 
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participation was constructed (Stevenson, Balling, and Kann-Rasmussen 2015; Jancovich 2017b). Our 
research therefore asks what might be learned by understanding the failures that are ignored in 
current discourse.
Methodology
The wider research project, from which this article draws its analysis, took place over a period of two 
years, and involved three stages. This paper draws on the first two stages only.
In stage one 8 workshops, with space for 20 people in each, were held with different interest 
groups. These comprised 2 workshops for policymakers, 2 for arts organisations, 2 for individual 
artists and 2 for cultural participants. The workshops were creatively facilitated and sought to identify 
the extent to which these different interest groups had shared or disparate definitions of success and 
failure in regard to cultural participation policies and projects. Participants in the workshops also 
discussed whether they saw value in talking about failure and the levers or barriers to doing so. In 
addition, workshop participants were asked to identify specific examples of success and failure in 
cultural participation policies and projects they were aware of but had not necessarily been 
involved in.
Due to the high level of interest in participating in these workshops an anonymous survey was also 
conducted to allow others to share their stories of failure, which received a further 100 responses.
From the examples of success most cited by workshop participants three case studies were 
identified for closer analysis in stage 2. These were Creative People and Places (www.creativepeo 
pleplaces.org.uk) an Arts Council action research programme that seeks to examine how place based 
funding might impact cultural participation; Fun Palaces (https://funpalaces.co.uk), an initiative 
started by two arts activists to shine a light on the skills and everyday creativity that already exist 
in communities by promoting local DIY cultural events; and Slung Low (www.slunglow.org) 
a professional theatre company currently co-managing an old working men’s club as performance 
venue and community space.1 In conducting these case studies, we considered what learning might 
be gained by examining areas of failure within the work of organisations whose narratives more 
commonly focused on success.
Stage 2 also involved 83 in-depth qualitative interviews with a larger sample of policymakers, 
funders, evaluation consultants, cultural professionals, and participants. Through these we further 
investigated the different meanings of participation given by different agents and their attitudes to 
failure. All of the interviews were transcribed and the data analysed alongside that generated 
through the survey and workshops.
Working inductively, a thematic approach to analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) was taken, and 
coding was conducted using the NVivo software. For the purposes of this paper the main themes 
identified related to the attitudes to and the value given to the notion of failure from professionals in 
the cultural sector, the way success and failure are evidenced and to what end, and the resultant 
failures that these attitudes and practices may themselves generate. From this, we have identified 
a new taxonomy of failures that were used in phase 32 of the research and will be explored in more 
detail in future outputs from this project.
Given the sensitivity of the topic, the names of all of those who took part in workshops and 
interviews were anonymised, but the representatives of the case studies agreed to the naming of 
their organisations, for which we are grateful and hope their example demonstrates the value of 
sharing stories of failure openly.
Fear of failure
Many of the cultural professionals3 who we spoke to supported the view that ‘art and culture can 
never fail’ (policymaker). All were far happier to talk about ‘how things could have been better’ 
(cultural professional). Failure was often felt to be too negative a term to employ. Time and again, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 5
words such as ‘discomfort’, ‘unease’ and ‘unhelpful’ were used to describe the way many profes-
sionals felt about the word. Some opposed what they saw as the ‘binaries’ or ‘finality’ implied by the 
term although interestingly they did not resist the word success in the same way. Furthermore, most 
felt you could always find something of value that had been the result of any given cultural activity. 
However, this value might have nothing to do with the specific intention of ‘increasing’ and 
‘widening’ access to culture. When asked if a project would have failed if it was intended to diversify 
the audience for a particular organisation but did not attract anyone who had not been to that 
organisation before, most interviewees agreed that this would, indeed, have been a failure. But they 
were doubtful if this were a narrative they would share. This supports the claim from the literature 
that policies and projects are rarely an outright failure, but need to be assessed against a range of 
domains that challenge these binary definitions if people are to feel comfortable talking openly 
about them.
To help challenge the narrative that failure is impossible, or should not be shared, all of those 
taking part in the workshops, surveys, and interviews were asked to share a story of failure and 
consider whether they had learnt from it. Significantly, many cultural professionals defaulted to 
a personal failing, which ranged from being a perfectionist and so having too high expectations of 
others to experiencing imposter syndrome in their role. While some said they had learned from 
reflecting on these failings many said it was something they couldn’t change or that thinking about it 
made them feel bad about their abilities.
When subsequently prompted to think of an example related specifically to cultural participation 
projects the majority of stories told by the cultural professionals were of micro operational failures 
(such as a van breaking down on the way to a show so it didn’t go ahead) or macro systemic failures 
(such as social inequalities in society at large) that were ‘acts of god’ which neither they nor the 
cultural sector could be held accountable for, or do anything about. Few offered any detail about 
how they had learnt from such failures and many found it an uncomfortable process to share such 
stories. Although not universal,4 it was clear that for many, talking about failure, especially failures 
related to activity they had been involved in, was highly challenging. For all that several of the 
cultural professionals interviewed said they had the Samuel Beckett quote ‘fail, fail again, fail better’ 
pinned on their office wall, most saw this as an aspiration rather than something they found easy 
to do.
Our analysis suggests that fear plays a large part in the discomfort exhibited by many of those we 
spoke with, in regard to publicly describing or acknowledging anything they have been involved in 
as having failed. Some felt that a fear of failure is common in the UK, rooted in a taboo of educational 
failure experienced as a child. Despite what some described as a growing business rhetoric around 
learning from failure it was also often felt that it is becoming harder to talk publicly about failure 
because of a ‘soundbite culture’ (evaluation consultant) where ‘everyone thinks a mistake is some-
thing that should be punished rather than something you can learn from’ (participant) and people 
are ‘scared of how their words will be used or abused’ (cultural professional). This is indicative of the 
extent to which it was not the fear of something failing that caused the most discomfort. Rather, it 
was the fear of being blamed for failures, or being perceived by peers as a failure professionally. It 
was felt this might affect future contracts, funding and partnerships. This demonstrates the impor-
tance that profile and reputation have as a measure of success or failure within the cultural sector, 
often over and above the purpose of the project or the impact on participation. As we will discuss 
later in the article, this fear reduces risk taking and encourages the production of uncritical stories of 
unconditional success from which the sector fails to learn.
Despite this evident discomfort with the label of failure when attached to their own work, many of 
the interviewees appeared far more at ease talking about failures ‘in general’, or times they felt they 
had been failed, or failures they perceived others to have caused. The remainder of the article will 
discuss some of these failures in more depth while also considering some of the reasons why 
learning from failures seems so hard to do.
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The numbers game
Most of the cultural professionals we spoke to acknowledged that the participation agenda was 
driven by the evidence that ‘publicly funded arts, culture and heritage, supported by tax and lottery 
revenues, are predominantly accessed by an unnecessarily narrow social, economic, ethnic and 
educated demographic that is not fully representative of the UK’s population’ (Warwick 
Commission 2015), which they saw as a failure of participation. As such, most agreed that the aim 
of participation initiatives was to address this inequality by reaching out beyond those who are 
already engaged with subsidised cultural activities.
Yet only a few of those we spoke to considered the extent to which the work they had created or 
funded had, or had not contributed towards attainment of this high-level policy objective. Instead, 
interviewees more often spoke about the extent to which cultural participation projects resulted in 
‘individuals whose life has been transformed’ (evaluation consultant). There were multiple references 
to improving health and wellbeing, increasing citizenship, and contributing to social cohesion. All of 
these narratives frame the participant as the problem who needs to be ‘fixed’ rather than the policies, 
projects and practices that create and sustain structural inequities in regard to how different people’s 
cultural lives are valued and supported.
This is not to suggest that those receiving funding are not concerned with capturing evidence 
about who they work with. Each of our case studies record demographic data about their audiences 
and celebrate the fact that their participants are more diverse than other organisations they know of. 
Who and how people participate is therefore also a clear criterion for measuring success or failure. 
But as our case study, Slung Low demonstrated, numeric data does not provide neutral evidence but 
can be used to create whatever narrative is needed. For example, they cited the fact that only eight 
people from their local community had engaged in their recent programme of work, with most 
participants coming from further afield. As their total numbers had increased and the previous 
season only engaged four local people, they argued that this could be presented as a success (100% 
increase in local participation and increased profile further afield) or a failure (numbers of partici-
pants from the local community continued to be low). But in reality, they believed it is only a deeper, 
and more nuanced understanding of the processes involved and the challenges faced in developing 
new audiences that has any value for shared learning. However, despite seeing the value in under-
standing the successes and failures in their process they felt compelled to focus their attentions on 
controlling a narrative that would maintain their profile.
For others collecting ‘evidence’ often became more about overall numbers than about the 
diversity of who participates. For all that one of the founders of Fun Palaces said ‘hashtag – it’s not 
about the numbers’ several of the Fun Palace local volunteers felt that the evaluation form they were 
sent by the head office was ‘all about numbers’. For staff working on Creative People and Places 
a commonly held view was that ‘it’s absolutely not about numbers [but there’s] a massive pressure to 
always have numbers’. Similarly, policymakers told us that it’s not ‘about numbers [but] without the 
numbers you can’t start the conversation’.
But this acceptance of the need to play the ‘the numbers game’ (cultural professional) as 
inevitable, was also seen to detract from the high-level aspiration of supporting a more diverse 
range of people to participate in culture, by focusing on quantity, as an easily measurable target, 
over a more nuanced discussion about the purpose of the activity or the process of delivery.
Many found it difficult to determine who had set the quantitative objectives they were required to 
report on. But they felt that this encouraged certain types of work, such as spectacle, which might 
achieve short-term numbers but not long-term change. Furthermore, there was lack of confidence in 
the value of this data beyond merely monitoring activity. There was no evidence of funders 
aggregating the monitoring data they received back to meaningfully assess the effectiveness of 
funded projects in delivering the purpose or objectives of the policy aim to create a permanent 
change to the diversity of people whose cultural lives are being valued and supported. Indeed, 
a number of our interviewees cited examples of policies or projects they knew had not delivered 
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significant or enduring change yet saw the same organisations receiving more funding to repeat the 
same type of projects.
Short-term successes but long-term failures?
For the project participants interviewed one of the ways in which they told us cultural policy and 
projects consistently fail is by failing to recognise their lived experience as cultural participants, in 
particular in regard to the cultural activities they already engage with:
I often go to places that are considered to be low income, low participation in the arts, and people do all sorts of 
creative things (participant)
Real cultural participation happens every single day (participant)
This particular failure was recognised by many of the cultural professionals who often showed 
awareness of the growing body of evidence around the prevalence of ‘everyday participation’ 
(Miles and Gibson 2016). This led a number to acknowledge that:
. . . there’s a real arrogance within a lot of arts organisations that they know what would be good for that 
community (cultural professional)
. . . it’s not working, because it doesn’t recognise, it doesn’t nourish the cultures that are there (cultural 
professional)
One of the key reasons why the statistics are so disappointing is because we are proposing a definition of culture 
which does not match the way in which culture is defined by a lot of people today (evaluation consultant)
Yet despite such acknowledgements it was recognised that there was ‘a failure to follow through in 
terms of funding’ to support the range of cultural activities that people take part in (policymaker) and 
an almost unanimous assumption that this would not change.
In part, this despondency stemmed from the recognition of another recurring failure, namely the 
preference for funding short-term projects that everyone knew could not be sustainable once the 
funding ended (irrespective of what they promised in the funding application). Many artists and arts 
managers spoke about the extent to which this encouraged ‘safe’ output-based work that could be 
easily reported on rather than developing work that could embed permanent structural changes 
within the cultural sector. Time and again we heard people say the same things:
. . . the biggest failure is that it hasn’t continued (participant)
. . . it’s worse, isn’t it, if you’re given something and you have a really good time and then it’s taken away (cultural 
professional)
. . . while the money was in place, they made interesting moves, but the minute there was no more money in 
place . . . one of the real problems for us was about trying to embed real cultural change and change in practice 
(policymaker)
. . . the biggest issue with organisations getting funding to work in areas of deprivation is that they come in, they 
do the project and they get the money, then they report and leave again . . . I think that would be a failure on 
their part, but nobody would notice, because they would have completed the project and reported [on it] 
(cultural professional)
This failure was evident in one of our case studies, Creative People and Places, which despite having 
the aspiration for long-term sustainability stated in the programme objectives, had the project 
mentality built in to its programme design. Places chosen to be part of the programme were 
given large amounts of funding at the start that decreased every three years, whatever their research 
and evaluation found.
I think if we are trying to achieve a more equitable cultural sector . . . to not sustain the investment in it, or to, you 
know, massively cut it each time, just to me feels . . . I don’t understand that (cultural professional)
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All the staff from Creative People and Places who were spoken to reinforced this point and the chief 
funder – Arts Council England – further endorsed this. Yet despite being described as an action 
research project and having gone through four phases of funding this fundamental aspect of the 
programme design remains unchanged. This is a clear example of failing to implement policy 
alterations, even in the face of evidence indicating the necessity to do so.
Interestingly, the place-based approach to funding which is at the heart of Creative People and 
Places has been adopted in other countries (Jancovich 2017a), including Wales and Scotland where 
we also interviewed policymakers as part of this research. While some of those interviewed in these 
other nations said they had learnt from the problems in Arts Council England’s programme design, 
they said this was not based on the sharing of evidence or policy learning between the different 
agencies. Instead, they said learning was limited by the fact that Creative People and Places had only 
been promoted as a success story. Any differences in the place-based approaches between the three 
countries were therefore based on hearsay or rumour (in other words narratives not evidence), 
personal gut feeling of the policymakers involved, or a desire to put their own mark on their 
approach. This further questions the extent to which policy-making is an evidence-based process 
and adds weight to the argument that framing the narrative may be as, if not more influential than 
building the evidence base.
‘Making the case’
There was consensus amongst artists and arts managers that the biggest barrier to talking more 
openly about failure, in a manner that would engender learning and encourage change, was the 
perceived prevalence of evaluation, performance management, and accountability frameworks. This 
supports the argument made earlier that a focus on accountability may reduce honesty rather than 
encourage it (Howlett, Ramesh, and Wu 2015). Significantly, the language of meeting objectives was 
often used interchangeably with meeting expectations, which suggests a desire to please someone 
else’s agenda, and acknowledges the subjectivity of the data from the outset. These expectations 
were commonly based on second-guessing what different stakeholders wanted rather than ‘grown 
up conversations between all parties’ (policymaker).
Many of those we spoke to who had delivered or managed participation programmes exhibited 
a lack of confidence in defining success and failure on their own terms. They also expressed 
a pressure from funders to ‘over promise’ when setting out their objectives in applications. This is 
at odds with the nature of participatory work where by definition ‘you can’t always know [your 
objectives] until you’ve got the end result with the people’ (cultural professional). But while many of 
those receiving funding often felt they were measuring success against objectives they did not set or 
necessarily support, some funders described a ‘self-elevating rhetoric’ in reporting dubious achieve-
ments that came from the arts organisations themselves. For some, obscuring project failures was 
endemic in the arts due to its ‘self-congratulatory insularity’ (funder) and across the board there was 
frustration that objectives were neither fully owned nor understood by any party.
Furthermore, a key principle of participation theory is that participants should be involved in 
a cyclical process from setting the objectives to evaluating the outcomes and informing how to take 
the work forward (Jancovich 2017b). Yet such inclusive and reflective involvement of participants, in 
defining success and failure, appeared to be the exception rather than the rule. Despite the cultural 
project participants we spoke with telling us that one form of failure would be ‘failing to meet 
participants needs’ rarely did any of the cultural professionals in our sample talk about the extent to 
which their priorities had been formed or altered by participants. Nor was meeting the participants’ 
expectations and accountability to the participants themselves, rather than the funders, commonly 
cited as a factor in considering the relative success/failure of a project.
Where participants were spoken to as part of an evaluation it was mostly commonly structured 
around questions to measure the objectives that had been on the initial funding application, rather 
than to assess whether those objectives were relevant in the first place. There was also no evidence 
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of evaluations including the opinions of those who opted not to take part, despite the recognition 
that ‘you have to look at it through the lenses outside the room as well’ (evaluation consultant). 
While most of the cultural professionals recognised the importance of capturing different voices they 
tended to use these different voices to tell a single narrative, often around the transformational 
impact of the work on individuals. But when evaluations fail to explicitly recognise conflicting 
perspectives and narratives it raises questions about whose lived experience matters most and the 
extent to which the invitation to ‘participate’ extends to challenging the ‘official’ narrative about the 
efficacy or even desirability of cultural participation projects and policies.
While many funders agreed that evaluations should offer something more than monitoring data 
in order to transparently account for expenditure, the distinction between monitoring and evalua-
tion appears to be commonly misunderstood, forgotten or ignored. This results in reports, increas-
ingly written by professional evaluators, which are ‘too often only looking back when [they] should 
be looking back with a future-oriented agenda’ (evaluation consultant). Indeed, most interviewees 
who had been the recipients of funding spoke about the need for evaluations, not in relation to 
learning, but rather as necessary tools with which to ‘make the case’5 for continued funding based on 
what McConnell (2010) defines as ‘political success’ or what we have defined above as profile. The 
extent to which narratives that support the profiles of individual artists and organisations are 
prioritised over honesty about how the initiative has succeeded or failed in its purpose or processes, 
is indicative of a collective failure in the cultural sector to consider the extent to which current 
approaches to supporting cultural participation are failing to make a difference to the entrenched 
inequity that presently exists.
Failing to learn
Many of those who took part in our research said afterwards that they found the opportunity to talk 
explicitly about failures as cathartic, liberating or a learning experience. Yet almost everyone said 
that they had experienced little to no opportunities to do this in such a candid manner before. Even 
the professionals, who said they had already acknowledged the value in learning from failure, felt 
their reflections were most likely to take place on a personal and private basis. It was much less 
common for such discussions to be shared across teams and almost never with participants or 
funders. Where they did take place it was always in the context of ‘safe spaces’ (cultural professional) 
with trusted peers.
In the case of Fun Palaces, there was recognised to be great value in sharing learning between 
different places. But the volunteer nature of the programme meant many of those we interviewed 
felt that in practice the only people who had the capacity to share their experiences were the paid 
regional ambassadors. The local volunteer organisers did not feel engaged in this process, let alone 
the participants who attended events, whose voices were collected through very standard satisfac-
tion surveys. Furthermore, the regional ambassadors we spoke to said that even among themselves 
there was a tendency, encouraged by the design of the evaluation, to share good news stories rather 
than discuss failures.
Within Creative People and Places there is funding to support a national peer-learning network. 
Staff from the programme all said that this did provide a safe space and that the longer the network 
had existed the more honest people felt they could be about failure within this. But most described 
the sharing of failure as a space for professionals to vent rather than learn. No one could think of any 
examples that led to programme or process change. Furthermore, while most Creative People and 
Place areas involve participants in decision-making on the artistic programme there is less evidence 
of them being involved at other points in the planning cycle such as agenda setting and evaluation. 
Despite the peer network also organising an annual conference which invites in the wider cultural 
sector many of those interviewed said what was presented in these forums was celebratory and 
promotional and did not encourage critical dialogue about the failures that had occurred or the 
changes that were necessary.
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For Slung Low, without being part of a network like the other two cases, while they were 
committed to the principle of sharing their learning across the sector, they said the reality of day- 
to-day life meant they rarely even had time to reflect among themselves as a team, let alone with 
participants. The participants of Slung Low we spoke to described them as a very open organisation, 
which was willing to listen but the nature of producing work always meant that they were on to the 
next project and so it became difficult to embed the learning.
In our wider sample, there was also a sense that, for all a number of cultural professionals talked 
about ‘the right to fail’ as a vital part of the creative process, there was also some doubt about how 
much the majority of those receiving funding wanted or were able to reflect critically on their own 
failures:
. . . the failure I see more regularly is that organisations don’t want to adjust and change (cultural professional)
[The problem is with] the ones who don’t see themselves as failing, so they would never come and say, “we’ve 
failed” because they wouldn’t acknowledge that that’s the issue (policymaker)
Or as one funder retorted:
. . . they [organisations and individuals receiving funding] say we need to be allowed to fail . . . everybody’s 
allowed to fail, the point is to learn . . . if you want carte blanche to not get it right again then that’s pointless
Within the UK cultural sector, a culture of truly critically reflective learning (Hanson 2013) appears 
either absent or at best simulated through the production of tactically constructed project reports 
and evaluations.
There was also scant evidence of funders critically evaluating their own funding strategies and the 
logics on which they are based. As noted above, there is scarce evidence of funders aggregating the 
data and information they receive back through evaluation reports in order to draw conclusions 
about the extent to which their own processes are working or whether the funding being distributed 
was cumulatively delivering their high-level aims and purpose. In turn, this has led to deep frustra-
tion and scepticism amongst the practitioners we spoke to about whether such evaluation reports 
are ever read:
. . . literally thousands of post-lottery grant reports sitting in a kind of data graveyard (evaluation consultant)
I have noticed very little interest in learning really . . . what is the point of spending months doing this, bothering 
people, doing dozens of interviews and then the report is not even read by the people who then make decisions 
(evaluation consultant).
Those interviewees we spoke to who worked for trusts and foundations readily recognised this 
failing and were able to point to specific actions they were taking to evaluate themselves more 
robustly. Although those who worked for arts councils and local authorities shared many of the same 
concerns, it was also evident they shared a similar pressure to those they funded around ‘making the 
case’ for continued subsidy and support from government. As one public sector funder said during 
a workshop ‘civil servants and ministers are looking for good news stories, they don’t want to hear 
about what’s gone wrong’.
Overall, when talking about the nature of evaluation and where the learning from failure should 
take place there was a tendency from all of our interviewees to relocate the responsibility elsewhere. 
The policymakers were less willing to explore the failures in their own programme designs but 
tended to expect that the organisations they fund should be more honest about what they had or 
had not achieved. The organisations receiving funding either passed the blame back to the funder 
for being too instrumental in what they wanted measuring, or down to the artist for not being able 
to deliver what was expected. Similarly, some artists passed blame both up the chain to the 
organisation or funder for setting unrealistic goals and down to the participant for not appreciating 
the opportunity on offer. It would appear that this perpetual process of passing the buck encourages 
a culture of evaluation that is more concerned with blame avoidance, ‘box-ticking’ and professional 
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protectionism than collective social learning predicated on a shared responsibility to make cultural 
participation in the UK more equitable.
Conclusion
Our research has found a cultural policy landscape in the UK that is not conducive to honesty, critical 
reflection or learning from failures. Through our research on cultural participation policies and 
projects we have shown there to be a lack of trust and open dialogue between participants, artists, 
cultural organisations and funders, which we posit may have wider implications across all areas 
under the jurisdiction of cultural policy.
A fear of losing funding and future work or damaging professional reputations is resulting in 
a tendency, for those working in the cultural sector, to reproduce narratives of success and to 
prioritise blame avoidance over meaningful learning. We argue that, as a result, the chance of 
success in achieving the intended purpose of a policy, even within the narrow terms of an individual 
programme, is itself reduced. The desire to demonstrate success discourages risk taking and 
encourages repetition of past mistakes. It further prevents learning from which the cultural sector 
might implement the structural changes needed to engender greater equity. For all that our 
interviewees told us the purpose of cultural participation policies was to create a more equitable 
cultural sector, it appears that achieving success in this regard is far less important than the profile 
success of self-preservation.
As such, cultural participation policies and projects have taken on a significant symbolic function, 
demonstrating an institutional or individual commitment to addressing the perceived problems of 
engaging specific publics, rather than attempting to understand, let alone ‘solve’ the problem in 
a more objective sense. Consequently, ambiguity becomes an essential part of policy formation and 
evaluation (Zahariadis 2003) and ‘feel-good’ narratives about success (Stone 2012) are employed to 
help to build and sustain advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988) concerned with maintaining the 
status quo.
However, the value that these ‘feel-good’ narratives have delivered for the profile of the UK 
cultural sector is by no means an outright success either as the legitimacy of public subsidy for arts 
and culture continues to be questioned in a way that, for example, education and health are not. As 
one policymaker said, ‘there is no shortage of evidence [about the value of cultural subsidy] the gap 
is the ability to convince’ (policymaker). So while demands to ‘better’ evidence the ‘value’ of art and 
culture continue to take up a significant amount of time and resource, the focus on success arguably 
contributes to this continued failure to convince.
We contend that the only learning being prioritised is that which May (1992) describes as 
‘political’ but which we have defined as profile, whereby those seeking to advocate for their own 
position within the field of cultural policy aim to better advance their arguments and ideas. In 
short, those who can exert most influence within the UK cultural sector primarily want to learn 
how to make their case better. Yet unless and until the UK cultural sector also acknowledges and 
learns from failures of process, practice and participation they will never deliver the scale of 
change required to create the sort of equity and inclusion they claim is the purpose of such 
work. As such, we tentatively offer a new taxonomy of success and failure, building on the findings 
above to include not only profile, but also purpose, process, participation and artistic practice as 
the 5 facets of cultural participation projects and polices that must all be examined if policy 
learning (May 1992) is to truly occur. Furthermore, ever more eloquent evaluations employing the 
same narratives of empowerment and transformation must give way to critical reflection (Hanson 
2013) that draws on different perspectives and narratives, recognising success and failure as being 
opposite ends of a spectrum rather than existing in binary opposition. Such work must be honest 
in recognising that a policy or project that succeeds for one group, community, or organisation 
might fail for another and that any successes may not be understood as such by all of the 
stakeholders. To adapt Howlett’s (2012b) position on policy analysis, if we accept that success 
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and failure are contingent on whose perspective we are looking from then policy evaluation must 
seek to answer: Success and failure for whom? To what degree? To what effect? It is these 
questions we are encouraging those working in the cultural sector to explore as part of the final 
stage of our research project.
Notes
1. We had initially planned to have a case study from at least one of the other nations of the UK but failed to find 
a suitable organisation willing to waive anonymity. However, additional interviews were conducted with 
representatives from a number of these organisations.
2. Stage 3 of the project involved the creation of an interactive website (https://failspaceproject.co.uk/) to trial 
a new taxonomy of success/failure for cultural participation policies and projects.
3. Throughout this article, we use the term ‘cultural professionals’ to refer to arts managers, participation workers, 
and artists. Evaluation consultants, funders, and policymakers are labelled separately.
4. Some professionals and many participants were more willing to embrace the term. It appeared from our sample 
that those who had followed less traditional education and career paths were least fearful of talking about 
failure, but there was insufficient data to confirm this hypothesis.
5. Funders from local authorities and the arts councils were more sensitive to the need for ‘making the case’ than 
funders from independent trust and foundations.
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